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INTRODUCTION 
In 1976, the Economic Community of West African States ["ECOWAS"] which is 
composed of fifteen countries, united to achieve lasting industrial development through a 
process of integration. The goals of the ECOWAS treaty emphasized the removal of 
barriers to the free flow of goods, services, and labor among the member countries as well 
as cooperative efforts in agriculture, industry, transportation, communications, and 
energy. 
In an ideal economic community each member country benefits from positive 
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"spread" - the increasing output and specialization of industry in the member country-
which results from the larger market size of the community and the benefits of economy 
of scale. Nevertheless, the poorer countries in such a community often fear that regional 
integration will aid in developing the richer countries at the expense of the poorer ones. 
One way to promote development in the poorer countries is to plan and finance the 
location and operation of new industry in these countries. While these activities are 
beyond the present capacity of the ECOW AS program, a regional development institu-
tion which is committed to investment in multinational and infrastructural projects in 
lesser-developed countries would advance regional integration and development. The 
success of the ECOWAS program largely depends upon such an institution. In the 
absence of international institutions which will provide enough capital for these activities, 
the African Development Bank has demonstrated a commitment to multinational and 
infrastructural development in West Africa. 
Part I of this article will discuss the reasons why the African Development Bank was 
created. Parts II and III will describe the growth, problems, and adjustments that it has 
experienced in meeting its goals. Part IV will discuss its special role in promoting regional 
development in the ECOWAS countries. 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 
A. Impetus for Creating the African Development Bank 
The African Development Bank was born after the defeat of the proposed Special 
United Nations Fund for Economic Development ["SUNFED"J.l With the culmination of 
independence movements throughout Africa, many African leaders looked to the United 
Nations as the agency to take the lead in financing development projects and programs in 
Africa. The proposed fund was appealing to African and other Third World leaders, 
because, as a United Nations agency, the voting power of all members would have been 
equal. This feature provided a greater degree of influence for the Third World nations 
than they would have had in the World Bank, where voting power is contingent upon the 
volume of subscriptions that are drawn. By having equal voting power with their capital 
exporting country counterparts, African nations would have had a significant impact on 
the policy and investment decisions of the proposed United Nations fund. Despite the 
attractiveness of the United Nations proposal, the idea for creating a special fund for 
economic development was abandoned when the World Bank proposed the creation of a 
soft loan window for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
["IBRD"]. 
The proposed soft loan window for the IBRD was designed to provide concessionary 
aid to underdeveloped countries, offering loans at 0.75 percent interest and on a forty 
year amortization schedule. In spite of this low cost of financing, African leaders were not 
enthusiastic about the World Bank proposal. They did not perceive a strong commitment 
by the World Bank in addressing the needs of Africa, especially in view of the low level of 
World Bank financing in Africa. For example, in 1960-1961, Europe and Australia 
received more than twice the level of aid than the entire continent of Africa.2 Moreover, 
1 For a history of the proposals for and eventual defeat of the Special United Nations Fund for 
Economic Development, see Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries, 1956 UNITED 
NATIONS V.B. 139-45, U.N. Sales No. 58.1.1. (1958). 
2 WORLD BANK, 1960-61 ANNUAL REpORT 16 (1961). 
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African nations had to forego the chance of acquiring equal voting power in SUN FED in 
favor of proportional representation based on the volume of subscriptions drawn at the 
World Bank. The combination of dissatisfaction with the World Bank proposal and the 
loss of SUN FED prompted African leaders to look toward establishing their own devel-
opment bank. 
The concept of a development bank wholly owned by African nations which would 
invest in African development was also consistent with the political climate in Africa 
during the late 1950s. With the recent trend toward independence came a strong senti-
ment for African unity and self-reliance. An African development bank that would invest 
in continent-wide development was a logical extension of this independence movement. 
The idea of an African development bank was formally proposed at the All-African 
People's Conference in 1960 in Tunis. In proposing such a bank, the African leaders were 
not acting without precedent; they had their Latin American counterparts to use as a 
reference. A former official of the ADB pointed out that "it was no accident that the 
Tunis resolution was adopted just a month after the Agreement Establishing the Inter-
American Development Bank entered into force."3 
In an effort toward developing the Tunis resolution, the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa ["ECA"], in February, 1961, began to study the possibility of 
establishing an African development bank. The initial findings of the ECA were suppor-
tive of the creation of an African development bank. To investigate further the feasibility 
of establishing such an institution in Africa, the ECA appointed a committee, comprised 
of representatives from nine African nations, to canvass opinions in Africa and the 
international community. The responsibilities of the committee were: 
a. to make all necessary governmental and other contacts relevant to the 
establishment of an African development bank; 
b. to complete comprehensive studies into the financial and administrative 
structure of the proposed development bank and into the nature and 
extent of its operations; 
c. to draft a charter for the proposed development bank; and 
d. to make recommendations for its location.4 
Through their governmental contacts, the "Committee of Nine" was able to catalogue 
several vital issues concerning the creation of the African Development Bank ["ADB"]. 
Upon completion of the feasibility studies, the "Committee of Nine" presented the 
following issues to the ECA. 
B. Issues Concerning the Creation of the ADB 
One of the most hotly debated issues among African countries concerning the 
structure and resource base of the ADB was whether membership should be open to 
non-African countries. A significant number of African countries opposed open member-
ship because they feared that outsiders could dominate the ADB by subscribing a majority 
share of the ADB's capital stock. This concern was compounded by the bitterness that 
many Africans still felt towards their former colonial oppressors. The idea of inviting the 
former colonialists to participate in an African development institution shortly after 
gaining independence did not appeal to them. 
3 I.E. EBONG, DEVELOPMENT FINANCING UNDER CONSTRAINTS: DECADE OF THE AFRICAN DEVEL-
OPMENT BANK 15 (1974) [hereinafter cited as EBONG]. 
4 ECA Res. (IV), U.N. Doc. FJ3586 (1962). 
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The African countries that favored open membership chose to look beyond the 
emotional aspects of the issue and emphasized the economic benefits of opening the 
capital stock of the ADB to non-African countries. The participation of non-African 
countries would provide an additional source of capital and would ease the burden on 
poor African subscribers. They believed that funding from poor nations alone would only 
serve to redistribute the limited resources of member countries. When questioned about 
the possibility of outside control, they argued that the ADB could be structured to insure 
that African nations maintained majority shares in the ADB. 
The resolution of this controversial issue was a compromise between maintaining 
African ownership of the ADB5 and including the securing of additional capital as a 
function of the ADB. Securing additional resources meant obtaining funds from the 
capital exporting countries. Two problems became apparent. First, there was some 
concern that the receipt of funds from non-African, capital exporting countries would 
interrupt the flow of bilateral aid which the African countries received. This concern was 
expressed at the Khartoum meeting in 1963 on the establishment of the ADB when a 
representative from Mauritania advocated the insertion of the word 'additional' because 
a number of countries receiving bilateral aid wished to maintain such aid without it 
passing through the ADB.6 Second, the general response of the capital exporting coun-
tries to the ADB was cold. The non-African countries were uncomfortable about commit-
ting funds to an institution in which they were denied voting rights. They were also 
skeptical about investing in a new institution which lacked any record of performance. In 
light of this response, the issue of securing additional funds through the ADB should 
have been a moot point. Unless the capital stock was open to non-African nations, the 
African countries would be left as the sole source of capital for the ADB. 
Another major controversy concerned the formula for representation on the ADB. 
This issue highlighted the differences between the large and small countries in Africa. 
The small resource-poor African countries were supportive of a one flag, one vote 
formula that would assure each member an equal share of votes. They were seeking an 
arrangement similar to that of the United Nations whereby the rights of smaller members 
are protected by assigning equal voting power to all. Another feature of their proposal 
which was similar to the United Nations structure was that capital subscription levels 
would be based on the ability of each member to pay, rather than on a strict minimum 
level. At the Khartoum meeting in 1963, small countries such as Gambia complained 
that the proposed minimum subscription level constituted twenty percent of that coun-
try's annual revenue and that the ADB should consider some other formula for assigning 
subscription levels.7 It is clear that setting subscription at levels that required twenty 
percent of a country's annual revenue would have prevented many smaller countries 
from joining the ADB. 
The large resource-rich countries, such as Algeria and Nigeria, advocated a formula 
of proportional representation which would acknowledge the larger financial commit-
ments of those countries. They reasoned that they would be more concerned about policy 
decisions than the smaller contributors because of their larger commitment to the ADB. 
Those that favored proportional representation were disturbed by the paranoia of the 
• Restricting the membership of the ADB to African countries was endorsed by the majority of 
African representatives at the Khartoum meeting in 1963 on the establishment of the ADB. African 
Development Bank - Agreement, V.N. Doc. FJeN. 141FMABl4I ADD 4-7, Comments and Proposals 
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Comments and Proposals]. 
8/d. 
7 /d. 
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smaller countries who feared that their position would be dominated by the larger 
members. The response of Algeria to the smaller countries' fear was expressed in the 
transcript of the Khartoum meeting: 
Although Algeria's share allocation was relatively large, it was a very poor 
country; the large contribution represented a sacrifice and nothing more. 
The Bank was ajoint venture based on faith in Africa's future. It could not go 
far if that faith was lacking. Hence there ought to be no fear that one country 
or group of countries would dominate the Bank.s 
Relying on mutual trust was not a convincing argument to the representatives of the 
small countries. The reasoning of a one flag, one vote system for all members as a means 
to insure fair representation was attractive, but without some form of proportional 
representation there was little impetus for resource-rich members to subscribe more than 
the minimum level of subscriptions. As a compromise resolution, the following formula 
was agreed upon in the ADB's charter: "Article 35 (1) Each member shall have 625 votes 
and, in addition, one vote for each share of the capital stock of the Bank held by that 
member."9 
Under this arrangement, the large contributors to the ADB were able to secure 
greater voting power than under a one flag, one vote system, but their degree of power 
was not as great as it would have been under their proposal for proportional representa-
tion. With minimum subscriptions set at US$ 1 ,000,000 and maximum subscriptions set at 
US$30,000,000, a member with the minimum level of subscriptions would have 725 votes, 
while a member with the maximum level would have 3,625 votes. Under this formula, the 
larger subscriber would have five times the voting power even though its subscriptions 
were thirty times greater. to This system of representation provided for a more equitable 
position between the large and small members while allowing the large members to make 
sizable contributions to the ADB. 
The tension between the large resource-rich countries and the small resource-poor 
countries highlighted the potentially disintegrative influence of imbalance among coun-
tries within the African community. The neo-classical economic perspective on regional 
integration would view the wide disparities between poor countries, such as Gambia, and 
rich countries, such as Nigeria, as a major obstacle to regional integration. When financial 
obligations are placed too heavily upon the poorer countries, the cooperative effort of the 
community can fail. The balancing formula of Article 35 helped ease the financial 
pressures on the smaller countries and calmed their fears of being dominated by the 
richer countries. Article 35 effectively dealt with the destructive potential of imbalances 
between countries, while permitting the positive force of the "prime movers" on the 
continent to invest in the growth of the ADB,u 
BId. 
9 African Development ~ Agreement Establishing the ADB, Article 35, U.N. Doc. E/eN. 
141ADB/36, Text of Agreement (1964). 
10 JOHN WHITE, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS: A STUDY OF INSTITUTIONAL STYLE 10203 
(1970). 
11 The concept of "prime movers" in an integration effort or a regionally based cooperative 
venture, such as the ADB, suggests that large political and economic powers within the African 
community are needed to lead the smaller countries. The basis for this concept is that large financial 
investments, fueled by a strong political will, are needed to develop the necessary infrastructure and 
institutions of a regional community. The ADB, as a continental institution, requires a large capital 
base to function as a development bank. Based upon the concept of "prime movers" this support 
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A final area of contention among African member countries concerned the scope of 
the ADB's operations. Countries such as Mauritania proposed that the ADB's operations 
be limited to multinational projects that aided regional developmentP The Mauritanian 
position was that national projects could be funded by national banks and bilateral aid, 
while the ADB could be the lead agency in regional and interstate development. Island 
countries, such as Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Comoros Islands, were naturally 
opposed to a multinational focus and insisted on a broader investment perspective for the 
ADB. In an effort to include a preference for projects that advanced regional develop-
ment and did not preclude the possibility of national projects, the African member 
countries agreed on Article 2 which states: "Special priority will be given to projects or 
programmes which by their nature or scope concern several members and are designed to 
make their economies increasingly complementary and to bring about an orderly expan-
sion of their foreign trade."13 Article 2 provided the ADB latitude in choosing national 
and multinational projects, although it did indicate a preference for regional develop-
ment. 14 
II. PROBLEMS OF OPERATING THE ADB - THE EARLY YEARS 1967-1973 
A. Reliance on African Sources 
The ADB was established in 1967, three years after the ratification of the agreement 
to establish the ADB. During the years between 1967 and 1973, the ADB experienced 
problems in meeting the goals of the African member countries. These problems were the 
result of the inadequate capital base, the high level of arrears on paid-in capital, the low 
loan ceiling, the lack of creditworthiness, and the delays in the commitment and dis-
bursement of loans. 
The ADB's operations between 1967 and 1973 were constrained by its inadequate 
capital base. The capital stock of the ADB was limited to the subscriptions of countries 
that were underdeveloped and least able to pay their share of subscriptions. The ADB's 
subscriptions were divided equally into paid-in shares and callable shares, with 125m units 
of account for paid-in and callable shares, a unit of account ["UA"] being equivalent to 
US$1.15 Dividing the subscriptions into paid-in and callable shares placed the ADB in the 
position of operating on the limited amount of dollars provided by the paid-in capital. 
The only other potential source of ready capital was the borrowings from the central 
banks of member countries. 
The ADB conducted its investment operations from 1967 to 1974 solely on its paid-in 
would come from the large subscribers in Africa. As seen by the terms of Article 35 of the Agreement 
Establishing the ADB ["Article 35"], countries such as Algeria and Nigeria are given a level of 
proportional representation that rewards their large contribution, thereby assuring the presence of 
"prime movers" in the ADB. In short, Article 35 has eased the destructive potential of imbalances 
between the countries while providing for the benefits of large capital subscriptions from the richer 
countries. 
12 Comments and Proposals, supra note 5. 
13 African Development Bank - Agreement Establishing the ADB, Article 2, U.N. Doc. ElCN. 
141 ADB/36, Text of Agreement (1964). 
14 See Comments and Proposals, supra note 5. 
13 Comments and Proposals, supra note 5. While a unit of account was originally equivalent to 
the American dollar, its value has fluctuated in relation to the dollar over the years. Equivalent values 
in dollars are usually specified when units of account are used in the text. 
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capital. Not until 1974 did the ADB support its operations through borrowings from the 
central banks of its member countries. With such limited resources at its disposal, the 
ADB invested only US$1l9,500,OOO in its first six years of operations. I6 Operating a 
development bank using only the paid-in capital of subscribers is unusual. Many of the 
international lending agencies, such as the IBRD, the Inter-American Development Bank 
["IDB"], and the Asian Development Bank ["ASDB"], fund their operations principally 
from borrowed resources while holding back on the disbursement of paid-in capital. 
Conducting lending operations on borrowed money helps to ease the pressure on sub-
scribers. The ability of these international institutions to secure borrowings in the mar-
ketplace is a result of the strength of their callable capital. I7 These institutions can back up 
their commitments with the obligation of their members to produce the called capital 
should the institution require it. Given the questionable standing of the ADB's callable 
capital, the ADB lacked the creditworthiness in the international market enjoyed by its 
counterparts in Asia, Latin America, and the United States. 
Other development institutions could support their creditworthiness with the finan-
cial strength of their members. The members of those institutions include the capital 
exporting countries, whose ability to produce callable capital is acknowledged in the 
international market. The ADB is totally comprised of underdeveloped countries whose 
individual creditworthiness is among the poorest in the world. The consolidation of their 
resources did not improve their creditworthiness in the international market. The conse-
quence of the ADB's poor credit standing and its subsequent reliance on the paid-in 
capital was that the poor were forced to aid the poorer. This was similar to the special 
funds used by the Communaute economique de I'Afrique de l'Ouest (West African 
Economic Community) ["CEAO"], the Entente Council, and the ECOW AS who depend 
on the relatively wealthy countries to make large contributions to redistribution funds 
designed to balance gains in the region. As evidenced by the special funds, the reliance by 
the ADB on paid-in contributions from its member countries results in insufficient capital 
to meet the task of investing in African development. Despite the relatively large subscrip-
tions of countries like Nigeria, Algeria, and Libya, the modest size of the paid-in capital 
limits the investment capability of the ADB, in addition to discouraging outside lenders. 
This problem was exacerbated by the poor performance of member countries in meeting 
their paid-in capital commitments. 
B. Subscription Arrearages 
The credit standing of a development bank based on the strength of its callable 
capital is usually evaluated by assessing the economic solvency of its membership. To 
determine the economic strength of a development bank by measuring its paid-in capital, 
one should look at the ability of its members to meet their obligations. By 1971, the ADB's 
percentage of arrears to callable capital was 26.17 percent, with the assigned level of 
paid-in capital set at llO.2m units of account. IS In view of the modest size of the paid-in 
capital required of the member countries, the high percentage of arrears indicated the 
weak economic standing or the lack of commitment of the ADB's members. With the 
small size of the ADB's paid-in capital and the high level of arrears on paid-in capital, 
16 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1973 ANNUAL REpORT 10 (1974). 
17 EBONG, supra note 3, at 8l. 
18 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1971 ANNUAL REpORT 45 (1972). 
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there was little possibility of the ADB operating on borrowed monies. The lack of access to 
the international markets prevented the ADB from performing one of its missions 
effectively: the attraction of additional resources to Africa. While operating on a short 
supply of funds, the ADB had to develop policies that would make the best use of its 
resources while enhancing the ADB's standing with outside lenders and donors. 
C. Loan Ceilings 
One policy designed by the ADB to conserve resources was the setting of loan ceilings 
for multinational and national projects. The loan ceiling policy, as stated by the ADB in 
1967 was as follows: 
In its initial period of operations, while its resources are dependent upon the 
continued payment of member countries of their scheduled subscriptions to 
the paid-up portion of the capital, the Bank will not be in a position to grant 
large loans. Therefore an upper limit of approximately $8 million has been 
set for multinational projects and one of $3 million for national projects .... 19 
The ADB was relegated to financing small projects or small portions of large projects 
because the loan ceiling prevented it from considering a wide range of development 
projects. This situation placed the ADB in the role of junior partner in projects in which 
they were cofinanciers. The loan ceiling also precluded the ADB from considering many 
multinational projects. From 1967 until 1973, when the loan ceiling was eight million 
dollars, the ADB made only three direct loans to multinational projects and extended one 
line of credit to a regional organization bank.20 
The ADB also had to absorb high administrative costs because of the loan ceiling. 
Small loans tend to incur greater administrative costs than larger loans. Larger sums of 
money committed to a project provide more revenue to the lending agency with which to 
cover its administrative overhead. When a project is small the revenue from the invest-
ment has to be stretched further to cover expenses. Since the cost of processing and 
implementing a loan is generally the same for large and small loans, a cost savings is 
realized from the volume of revenue obtained from larger loans. As shown in Table 1, 
during the last three years of the 1 967 loan ceiling, the ADB's ratio of loan commitments 
to administrative costs was high compared to the IBRD and the Commonwealth Devel-
opment Corporation ["CDC"]. These high administrative costs were also partially the 
result of the ADB's slow "take-off," its limited resource base, and the small size of its 
operations. 
D. The Pursuit of Credibility 
The small size of the ADB's operations and its limited resource base had an impact on 
the ADB's policies concerning project selection. The project selection criteria for the ADB 
was to include projects and programs that "contribute to the economic development and 
19 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, LOANS AND INVESTMENTS 9 (1967) [hereinafter cited as LOANS 
AND INVESTMENTS]' 
20 See AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1971 ANNUAL REpORT (1972); AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 
BANK, 1972 ANNUAL REpORT (1973); AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1973 ANNUAL REpORT (1974). 
The three direct loans were made to Air Afrique, the Mano River Bridge, and the Regie de Chemin 
de Fer Abidjan-Niger (Abidjan-Niger Railroad Agency). The line of credit was extended to the East 
African Development Bank. 
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social progress of its members - jointly and individually."21 Although the term "social 
progress" is not defined it appears to include projects where the social value overrides 
economic productivity. If this is actually the spirit of the term, its use in project selection 
decisions was not apparent. The ADB's policy of removing projects which were "social" in 
nature from its selection of potential projects was a result of its poor credit standing. 
In order to convince the international market that it was creditworthy, the ADB 
planned to demonstrate wisdom in its investments by using sound banking criteria iq its 
project selection.22 This approach appears to have been influenced by the "Committee of 
Nine's" conclusion that the capital exporting countries wanted to observe the ADB's 
performance before committing any funds to its operations. The decision to direct loans 
to "bankable" projects may have been a sound strategy for attracting outside funds for the 
ADB, but the policy altered the original understanding of the ADB's purpose. 
Although there is no exact definition of what constitutes a "bankable" project, the 
term usually refers to projects that have good prospects for a profitable return. The ADB 
chose not to fund social projects relating to housing, hospitals, and rural water supply 
because of the low rate of profitability. The ADB reasoned that it needed "soft loan 
money" to fund these types of projects.23 The ADB visualized the forming of a special 
fund, the African Development Fund ["ADF'], which would serve as a soft loan window 
for the ADB, much like the International Development Association ["IDA"] does for the 
IBRD. 
In order to insure that projects showed a profitable return, the ADB focused its 
investments in national projects in the member countries with the strongest economies. 
During the first seven years of the ADB's operations, the countries with the strongest 
economies, namely, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Algeria, and Kenya, received the largest volume 
of loan commitments in their regions.24 These countries were also favored by the ADB 
requirement that the host country of a project invest "approximately 50% of the cost of 
the project" as a condition for receiving a loan.2s This clause of the ADB loan policy 
prevented several of the poorer members from considering ADB loans. 
The policies favoring the wealthier countries may have provided the ADB with a 
solid record of "bankable" projects, but they did not necessarily make the economies of 
member countries more complementary nor did they produce regional development. 
The disintegrative effect of imbalances between countries can occur in a laissezjaire 
economic union which fails to account for growing disparities between the countries. 
"Backwash" is one of the problems confronted by regional economic communities that try 
to balance gains between the countries. The ADB's first seven years of investment 
exacerbated "backwash" by diverting funds to the wealthier countries. 
"Backwash" is the tendency of capital development activity to be centered in regional 
growth poles. These growth poles are typically found in the wealthier countries of the 
region where there is an infrastructure that makes development possible. The tendency 
of capital to concentrate in the wealthier countries turns the poorer countries into 
"backwaters." As a result, poorer countries eventually break away from the regional 
community and attempt to develop their own industrial centers behind the protection of 
their national boundaries. Direct investments need to be made in the poorer countries in 
order to avoid this outcome. The CEAO, the Entente Council, and the ECOWAS use 
21 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1971 ANNUAL REpORT (1972). 
22 LoANS AND INVESTMENTS, supra note 19, at 7. 
23 [d. 
24 EBONG, supra note 3, at 131. 
25 LoANS AND INVESTMENTS, supra note 19, at 13. 
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their special funds to initiate regional investment in poorer countries, but their special 
funds are undercapitalized. Without such funds, the poorer countries must look toward 
foreign aid and the ADB to make the necessary investments to remedy the problems of 
"backwash." 
The ADB's concentration of investments in the wealthier African countries during its 
first seven years heightened and accelerated the problems of "backwash." Without any 
investment from the ADB, local and foreign investors tended to channel their monies into 
projects within the growth poles. This disintegrative effect was compounded by the small 
number of multinational projects that were funded by the ADB. Additional investments 
in multinational projects may have mitigated the disparities between the member coun-
tries. 
In defense of the ADB's inactivity in funding multinational projects during the first 
loan ceiling period, there were only a small number of regional authorities or organiza-
tions that could oversee the management of regional projects. A regional body serves as a 
conduit for loans and coordinates the arrangements between its member countries, such 
as which country will receive the loan, who will guarantee the loan, who will manage the 
project, how rights of access will be decided, and which country will absorb the costs. The 
absence of regional bodies in West Africa during the first loan ceiling period indicates a 
lack of institutional support for the ADB in financing multinational projects.26 Although 
approximately twenty-six organizations now exist in West Africa, eighteen of them were 
formed in 1970 or thereafterP By 1973, all loans by the ADB to multinational projects 
were made to regional entities. 28 
The ADB was also under greater pressure from member countries to fund national 
projects than to fund multinational projects. Each country believed that if it must pay a 
certain amount in subscriptions, it should receive a commensurate amount in loans. The 
member countries preferred national projects because they could maintain political con-
trol over the projects and realize all of the benefits. The political pressure on the ADB to 
award its loans to its members, rather than to good projects, diverted the ADB from 
projects that were not geographically hourd. 
An extension of the need for national projects and political control is the reluctance 
of national political leaders to concede any power to a regional body. National political 
leaders tend to be uncomfortable with conceding power to an outside authority. This 
uneasiness is more apparent in those leaders who must deal with internal political 
instability or who govern from a weak political base. Multinational projects that require 
interstate authorities to administer and control the project are not viewed favorably by the 
national I~adership. 
The fears of these national leaders are compounded by the volatility of national 
leadership within the nations of Africa. National leaders tend to be cautious when making 
interstate agreements because, in light of the numerous coups and attempted coups in 
Africa, they are aware that an agreement made between heads of state can quickly be 
undermined by a radical change in leadership. For this reason, some national leaders 
avoid multinational projects that require regional authorities. 
One way to overcome the concern that regional coordination can be destroyed is to 
establish regional cooperation and to show the success of its operations. The ADB could 
26 There is no guarantee, however, that the ADB would have diverted money from national 
projects to finance multinational projects. 
27 J. P. RENNINGER, MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT IN WEST AFRICA 26 (1979). 
28 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1974 ANNUAL REpORT 33 (1975). 
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take the lead in assisting African countries in forming regional authorities to ease the 
pressure for national investments. Another strategy that the ADB could use to ease this 
pressure would be to shift the ADB's reliance on capital away from the member countries 
and to expand its resource base by securing additional funds. 
Besides the bias of member countries for national projects and the lack of institu-
tional support for multinational projects, the ADB was also apprehensive about commit-
ting a large sum of its limited capital to a small number of projects. If a few larger 
multinational projects had failed, the ADB would have been faced with heavy losses which 
would have further eroded its credibility as an investment institution. By 1972, both the 
IBRD and the IDA had committed worldwide only 1.9 percent of their total financing to 
multinational projects or programs.29 Without other investors contributing to multina-
tional projects, the ADB could not invest in a multinational project without assuming the 
total cost. 
E. Erratic Disbursement Performance 
In its early years, delays in processing and disbursements of loans plagued the ADB. 
This indicator is important in assessing an investment institution's performance in financ-
ing projects because it reflects the ability of the institution to respond to proposed projects 
and to release its funds quickly. Compared to other major lenders, the poor performance 
of the ADB in its early years is clearly shown in Table 2. In later years, the ADB began to 
improve the percentage of loans committed per year that were actually disbursed. 
The difficulty that the ADB experienced in disbursing its loans can be attributed to a 
slow start-up period during its first four years of operations. Comparing the disburse-
ment data of the ADB, the IBRD, and the CDC in Table 2 could be misleading, because 
the IBRD and the CDC operated on a worldwide scale while the ADB operated only in 
Africa. Yet, the ADB's success in disbursing funds in Africa was not competitive with the 
IBRD and the CDC. 
A problem related to slow disbursements is the difficulty the ADB has had in 
committing its capital to actual development projects. Much of the ADB's capital stock has 
been invested in time deposits rather than in development pr~jects. This practice does not 
encourage member countries to meet their paid-in capital commitments. Member coun-
tries rightfully question the need for additional capital for operations when such a large 
portion of capital is not invested in development projects. An indicator of the ADB's 
inability to commit its capital to development projects is the rate of income that it realizes 
from investments. Most development agencies that are able to commit their capital to 
projects tend to have a low rate of profit, whereas the ADB's rate has been consistently 
high. By 1975, the ADB's profit rate had reached 37.5 percent, while the CDC had a 
profit rate of only 2.1 percent.30 The 1969 ADB Annual Report attempted to explain the 
high rate of profit a, follows: "It may be pointed out that the substantial increase in 
income of 59.7% is the result of the exceptionally high rates offered for the funds not 
utilized for operational purposes and placed on time deposit."31 
The problem of not being able to commit its capital to development projects was most 
serious in the ADB's first four years of operation. The total number of loan projects was 
29 EBONG, supra note 3, at 133. 
30 W.R. Johnson, untitled collection of data (1982) (unpublished collection) [hereinafter cited as 
Johnson]. W. R. Johnson is currently Professor of Political Science at Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
31 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1969 ANNUAL REpORT 41 (1970). 
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only twenty-four during these four years.32 The following three years reflected a sharp 
increase in the number of projects funded by the ADB, with the cumulative number of 
loan projects reaching fifty-three in 1973.33 Fifty-three loan projects in seven years of 
operation is not a handsome number of investments and appears to be an illusory 
indicator of progress when compared to the volume of loan commitments by other 
lending agencies. Overall, the ADB's ability to commit more of its capital stock to projects 
during its first seven years was poor. 
In summarizing the performance of the ADB's first seven years of activity, the most 
fundamental constraint on its operations was its limited resource base. The lending 
operations of the ADB were funded entirely from the paid-in capital of its subscribers. 
This process of funding the ADB's activities created a situation where the ADB merely 
served as a facilitator in redistributing a small amount of capital among its members. The 
limited size of the capital stock forced the ADB to conserve capital and to narrow the 
scope of its projects to those that were "bankable" and within the loan ceiling. 
The small size of the loan projects that the ADB funded in its early years produced 
high administrative costs. The ADB may have actually been top-heavy as an agency, but 
the consistent decline of the disbursement to administrative cost ratio seems to reflect a 
greater efficiency of output rather than an excess of staff. An additional effect of the 
small loan size was the diversion of a high volume of loans to the wealthier member 
countries. This diversion of loans was contrary to the founding spirit of the ADB which 
was to make member countries' economies more complementary and to advance regional 
development. 
Another product of the small loan size was the ADB's emphasis on national projects. 
The political pressure on the ADB to commit itself to many national projects impaired its 
ability to invest in more than a few multinational projects. The ADB was further inhibited 
from funding additional multinational projects because of the lack of regional bodies to 
receive loans and to manage projects. The absence of cofinancers for multinational 
projects also constricted the ADB's activity in this area. 
The ADB also had a poor history of committing and disbursing its funds. The 
inability of the ADB to commit significant portions of its capital to development projects 
sent discouraging signals to its subscribers and to potential outside lenders. This problem 
was exacerbated by the ADB's poor performance in disbursing loans to projects. The loan 
commitments to disbursements ratio improved for the ADB in the latter part of its first 
seven years of activity, but the ADB's performance was not comparable to the other 
investment institutions which were lending in Africa. As a result, the African countries 
did not view the ADB loans to be as reliable as those offered by the IBRD and the CDC. 
This perception further weakened the credibility of the ADB. 
In spite of all these setbacks and constraints, the ADB consistently expanded its 
lending activity. By 1973, the ADB had more than doubled its total number of loan 
projects from the number attained in 1971. The increased number of loans committed 
and its consistent improvement in disbursing funds indicated that the ADB would be able 
to survive as a lending institution. 
32 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1976 ANNUAL REpORT 21 (1977). 
33 [d. 
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III. ADJUSTMENTS BY THE ADB - 1974-1979 
A. Access to Funds Outside Africa 
The issue of whether to open the ADB's capital stock to non-African countries 
continued to be debated through the difficult years of its start-up period. The topic was 
too politically and emotionally controversial for an objective debate on the merits. By 
1974, the question of opening the capital stock had not yet been decided. The ADB's 
Board of Governors still were not in favor of the proposal. It was obvious at this point that 
one of the ADB's fundamental problems in functioning as a development bank was its 
reliance on paid-in capital to cover its operations. In 1974, the ADB began to supplement 
its operations through borrowings from the central banks of its members. These loans, 
however, did not provide additional funds for Africa. Borrowing from the central banks 
of member countries merely reinforced the ADB's role in redistributing resources 
throughout Africa. In 1975, the ADB finally obtained additional funds when it secured a 
US$65,OOO,OOO loan from a syndicate of United States banks.34 
With access to borrowed money on the international market, the ADB could begin to 
expand its operations in addition to holding back on the use of its paid-in capital. This 
feature would ease the strain on subscribers and lessen the political pressure on the ADB 
from member countries. It is not clear how the ADB was able to gain the confidence of 
outside lenders, although one factor may have been its improved record of clearing up 
subscribers' arrearages. 
Other institutions, such as the IBRD, the IDB, and the ASDB are able to secure 
borrowings on the international market based on the strength of their callable capital. In 
the IBRD, the callable capital since 1974 has been nine times larger than the amount of 
paid-in capital.35 The IBRD's maintenance of such a large proportion of capital in 
relation to paid-in capital and its use of large sums of money borrowed on the interna-
tional market reflect the deep faith that investors have in the strength of the IBRD's 
subscribers. The ADB does not enjoy 'that degree of faith from foreign investors. The 
ADB's callable capital to paid-in capital ratio up until 1975 was one to one, with a paid-in 
amount of UA 193.93m [US$217.69m].36 The ADB could not gain the confidence of 
potential foreign investors with such a ratio. By 1975, the ADB's improved record of 
meeting its paid-in capital schedule may have given the lenders a sense of relative security. 
The ADB's summary statistics on arrearages through 1975 are shown in Table 3. 
The level of arrearages in relation to paid-in capital declined substantially between 
1972 and 1974. A higher proportion of subscribers meeting the paid-in capital schedules 
reflected a stronger commitment by the member countries to keep the ADB solvent and 
operating. The size of the ADB's subscriptions had also grown over the years. Whether 
the increased size of the subscriptions was caused by an individual member drawing more 
subscriptions from the ADB, as Nigeria has done, or by the Board of Governors raising 
the subscription levels for all members, or by the addition of new member countries, the 
increase in paid-in capital broadened the ADB's operations and reassured skeptical 
34 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1975 ANNUAL REpORT 30 (1976). 
3. See WORLD BANK, 1975 ANNUAL REpORT (1975); WORLD BANK, 1976 ANNUAL REpORT (1976); 
WORLD BANK, 1977 ANNUAL REpORT (1977); WORLD BANK, 1978 ANNUAL REpORT (1978); WORLD 
BANK, 1979 ANNUAL REpORT (1979); WORLD BANK, 1980 ANNUAL REpORT (1980); WORLD BANK, 1981 
ANNUAL REpORT (1981). 
36 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1975 ANNUAL REpORT 38 (1976), 
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foreign investors. As the ADB continued to increase its subscription levels and decrease its 
arrearages after 1975, its access to foreign credit became easier. 
Policy changes by the ADB may have also enhanced its position as a borrower in 
foreign markets. In 1976, the ADB decided to increase the ratio of callable capital to 
paid-in capital. In 1979, the ratio had grown to three to one and, as a result, access to 
foreign lenders became even easier. The President of the ADB from 1977 to 1979, 
Kwame Donkoh Fordwor, explained the policy as follows: 
The callable capital is intended in effect to be the owners' guarantee of the 
bank's indebtedness. As such, its exploitation in the operations of the bank is 
more than an invitation to outsiders to share the owners' faith in their 
willingness and ability to pay for that amount of debt on the evil day -- which, 
with good management, would never come - when the bank might have to 
close its doors because of insolvency ... It was in this spirit that I decided -
with some temerity - that this ratio was too high. If we lowered it, there 
would be a larger margin of callable capital on the faith of which we could 
borrow more. All it needed was faith on the part of the available lenders, and 
that would largely depend on outsiders.37 
The ADB's access to outside credit almost doubled between 1977 and 1979. This was 
partly a result of the ADB's success in floating bonds in Kuwait in 1976, and its first 
issuance of bonds in the Eurobond market. The increase in foreign loans and paid-in 
subscriptions helped to address one of the ADB's earlier problems: limited sources of 
capital. Entering into the bond market also allowed the ADB to operate more on bor-
rowed money than on paid-in capital. In addition to easing pressure on subscribers, the 
ADB's increased resource base made it possible for it to raise the loan ceiling from 
US$4,000,000 in 1973 for national projects to US$8,000,000 in 1979. Table 4 shows the 
ADB's improved resource base. 
The radical increase in the ADB's resource base did not solve its resource problems. 
The loans to the ADB from non-African sources were still quite modest when compared 
to those of the IBRD, as shown in Graph l. The additional sources of funds, however, 
have allowed the ADB to make progressive changes in its operations. 
The ADB has begun preliminary inquiries into the possibility of opening the capital 
stock to non-African countries.38 This would increase the paid-in capital through the 
subscriptions drawn by the non-regional members. The presence of capital exporting 
countries in the ADB's membership would also enhance the credibility of its callable 
capital. With an ability to secure credit like that of the IBRD, the IDB, or the ASDB, the 
ADB would move closer to being able to finance its lending operations primarily from 
borrowed funds, as the IBRD did in 1981.39 Allowing non-regional members into the 
ADB would alter the all-African composition of its membership, but in 1978 the Board of 
Governors stipulated that any formula for opening the capital stock must preserve the 
African character of the ADB in its leadership, operations, and voting power.40 
The Board of Governors' resolution in 1978,41 which showed a willingness to open 
the ADB's capital stock, may have contributed to the ADB's successful efforts to enter the 
37 J.D. FORDWOR, THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK: PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERA-
TION 76 (1981) [hereinafter cited as FORDWORj. 
38 Id. at 85. 
39 WORLD BANK, 1981 ANNUAL REpORT 85 (1981). 
40 FORDWOR, supra note 37, at 121-22 (ADB, Board of Governors, Resolution 02-78 adopted at 
the closed sitting on May 1, 1978). 
41 Id. 
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Eurobond market in the following year. Once the ADB entered the Eurobond market, 
there was a strong possibility of reentering it or eventually entering the Japanese bond 
market. This new access began to display positive effects on the loan operations of the 
ADB. 
Between 1974 and 1979, the annual number of projects to which the ADB was 
committed increased steadily from twenty-five in 1974 to thirty-five in 1979. Bl\t the more 
important statistic was the average size of loans that the ADB made to projects during this 
period of time. Table 5 indicates the increasing size of the ADB loans to projects in the 
six-year period from 1974 to 1979. 
The increase in the percentage of the total cost of projects that the ADB funded also 
reflects the larger development role of the ADB. The ADB's share of the total cost of 
projects rose from nineteen percent in 1978 to twenty-one percent in 1979, showing 
increased participation as a cofinancer in development projects. During the last six years 
of operation, the ADB has also been able to substantially lower its administrative costs in 
relation to commitments and disbursements, to increase the amount of capital going to 
development projects, and improved its record on the disbursement of funds. 
B. Internal Improvements 
The ADB continued to maintain a much higher level of costs for operations than 
many of the other development institutions operating in Africa. This does not seem to be 
solely because the ADB was restricted to small projects, since the Arab Bank for Economic 
Development in Africa ["BADEA"] and the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Develop-
ment have also taken on small projects and emerged with lower administrative costs. The 
ADB appeared to be administratively top-heavy, with its staff increasing from 258 in 1974 
to 606 in 1979.42 The sharp decreases in the ADB's administrative costs in relation to loan 
commitments and disbursements, despite the dramatic increase in staff, would seem to be 
a result of the ADB's improved loan efficiency and the expanded scope of its loan activity. 
Although the decline in these costs are encouraging, the comparably high levels main-
tained by the ADB, as shown in Graphs II and III, show a level of inefficiency that may be 
counterprod ucti ve. 
The ADB also committed an increasing percentage of its capital to development 
projects. By comparing the ratio of the ADB's development portfolio to its total revenue, 
it is clear that the ADB began to receive a larger portion of its revenue from its projects. 
In 1979, 85.36 percent of ADB's total revenue came from its development activity.43 
Another indication of the ADB's increased commitment to investing its capital in projects 
is the ADB's falling profit rate. In 1975, the ADB realized a profit rate of 37.5 percent; by 
1979, the profit rate fell to 12.3 percent.44 With a major portion of the ADB's capital used 
for development purposes, the ADB was able to improve its credibility with subscribers 
and potential lenders. 
Another area where the ADB upgraded its operations was the disbursement of loans 
committed to projects. The development institution with the best disbursement record for 
those operating in Africa during this period was the CDC, which consistently had a ratio 
of sixty to seventy percent of disbursements to loans. It should be pointed out, however, 
that most of the CDC's investments were through loans or equity participation in continu-
42 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1974 ANNUAL REpORT 22 (1975); AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 
1979 ANNUAL REpORT 45 (1980). 
43 Johnson, supra note 30. 
44 [d. 
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ing projects.45 The ADB's disbursement record, after an erratic beginning in 1967 
through 1974, has in recent years become almost equal to that of the IBRD. The 
disbursement figures for the IBRD and the ADB from 1971 to 1979 are shown in Table 6. 
The ADB has established a general consistency in its disbursements which, like the 
IBRD, is approximately forty-five percent of loans disbursed per year.46 The ADB's real 
success, however, goes beyond administrative improvements in the commitment and 
disbursement of loans. The creation of the ADB's two soft loan windows, the African 
Development Fund ["ADF"] and the Nigerian Trust Fund ["NTF'], demonstrates the 
ADB's growth and maturity. 
c. The Creation of the ADF 
When the ADB began its operations in 1967, it was reluctant to invest in projects in 
the least-developed member countries. The reason for the ADB's reluctance was: "That 
for the time being the Bank should not make any loans from its own capital resources to 
countries which are not good risks, that it should invest its resources in bankable projects 
in creditworthy countries .... "47 An alternative plan to benefit the poorer member coun-
tries was to establish a special fund, with contributions from non-African countries, that 
would provide long-term loans on concessional terms. 
The ADB was actually eager to erect a soft loan window, similar to the IDA within the 
IBRD, that would supplement ADB loans with concessionary financing. This arrange-
ment would allow the ADB to mix its conventional financing with soft loan money in 
order to provide better terms on ADB loans. Underlying the ADB's efforts to develop a 
soft loan window for mixing loans was the problem that the ADB was unable to fund 
many infrastructure portions of development projects as a result of their low profitability 
potential.48 Financing these foundation-laying activities was often essential for the suc-
cessful completion of commercial projects. To finance the infrastructure segment of 
larger commercial projects, the ADB needed a soft loan window that could provide 
concessionary financing. 
In 1974, the ADB was finally able to attract enough foreign support for a soft loan 
window. The ADF, the second member of the ADB group, was inaugurated as a devel-
opment fund In 1974 with total subscriptions equalling UA80,659,050 
[US$97,303,045].49 The ADF was designed to be a multilateral fund that "would receive 
contributions in the form of grants and not loans."5o The ADF was supported by subscrip-
tions from the ADB and fourteen non-African countries. Although the operating capital 
of the ADF was less than the ADB's original goal of UA130m, the ADF was able to begin 
operations quickly in 1974. 
The Board of Directors of the ADF is mainly composed of foreign nationals, al-
45 COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 1973 REpORT AND ACCOUNTS (1974); COM-
MONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT CoRPORATION, 1974 REPORT AND ACCOUNTS (1975); COMMONWEALTH 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 1975 REpORT AND ACCOUNTS (1976); COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, 1976 REpORT AND ACCOUNTS (1977); COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT CoRPORATION, 
1977 REpORT AND ACCOUNTS (1978); COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 1978 REpORT 
AND ACCOUNTS (1979); COMMONWEALTH D~VELOPMENT CORPORATION, 1979 REpORT AND ACCOUNTS. 
48 The year of 1979 was the exception. The sudden increase in the volume of loans between 
1978 and 1979 may have been responsible for the sudden decline in the ADB's disbursement record. 
47 AFRICAN DEVE~OPMENT BANK, Board of Governors, 3d Meeting, Working Paper on Special 
Programme for Relatively Less Developed Member Countries 4-5 (August, 1967). 
48 EBONG, supra note 3, at 63 
49 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1974 ANNUAL REpORT 14 (1975). 
50 EisONG, supra note 3, at 63. 
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though the ADB maintains a fifty percent interest in the ADF, and the President of the 
ADB serves as the Chairman of the Board. The ADF has a staff that appraises, processes, 
and implements its loans. This staff has a number of foreign nationals who provide 
technical assistance. Much of the staff's work was simplified because of the experience the 
ADB had in selecting projects and processing loans. With the assistance of the ADB, the 
ADF immediately started making loans on concessionary terms.51 Approximately eighty 
percent of the ADFs loans went to the least-developed countries in Africa. 52 
The eligibility criteria for the ADF loans were separated into three levels of priority. 
All member countries were eligible to receive ADF loans, but the highest priority was 
given to member countries with per capita incomes that were equal to or below U8$280. 
The next level of eligibility was countries with per capita income levels between U8$281 
and U8$550. The final level of eligibility included those countries that either renounced 
their rights to benefit from the ADF or whose per capita income was above U8$550. 
The ADB's concentration of investments in the relatively wealthy countries increased 
the regional imbalances between countries by fueling the process of "backwash." The 
creation of the ADF offered a promise of counteracting this trend. This hope was 
supported by the 1974 investment portfolio of the ADF, which showed eighty percent of 
its investments going to the least-developed countries in Africa. With the investments of 
the ADF directed to the poorer countries, the ADB investments were beginning to 
become balanced between the rich and the poor countries. Nevertheless, the balancing of 
investment did not fully address the problems caused by "backwash." 
The reason why investments tend to be concentrated in the growth pole areas is 
primarily attributable to the existing industrial activity and the developed infrastructure 
and amenities. The strategy for shifting investments away from the growth poles and 
toward the "backwaters" is to develop the infrastructure and amenities of such an area, in 
addition to investing in new industries. The ADF is designed to make investments in 
infrastructure projects, but it is limited to making these investments in social projects. 
80cial projects include the development of hospitals, housing, water supplies, schools, 
roads, and other types of infrastructure projects. These types of loans by the ADF help in 
the fight against "backwash" to the extent that infrastructure -and area amenities for 
industry are developed. The scope of the ADFs investments include the development of 
the necessary infrastructure that must exist to support industrialization. Without the 
power to invest in new industrial development in the poorer countries, however, the ADF 
is unable to fully address the problem of industrial imbalances between the rich and poor 
countries. One of the ADB's strategies for overcoming this problem is to increase the 
cofinancing activity between the ADF and the ADB in the area of multinational projects. 
This strategy does not address the need for national project financing of new ind us tries in 
the poorer countries. Nevertheless, there is an impact on the problem of industrial 
imbalances between countries when these cofinanced multinational projects are 
industry-related and include the poorer countries. 
Despite the ADF's laudable goals in investing in the poorer countries, the ADF 
experienced difficulties because of its limited available capital. In 1974, the ADF issued 
loans for seventeen projects or studies with an average loan size of U8$2,740,000. In 
1979, the ADF operations had expanded to the point that it issued loans to twenty-three 
51 Id. at 76. 
52 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1979 ANNUAL REpORT, LENDING POLICY 5 (1980) [hereinafter 
cited as LENDING POLICY]. 
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projects or studies, with an average loan size· of US$lO, 770,000. 53 This surpassed the 
average size of an ADB loan by almost US$2,000,000. With the ADF issuing loans at 0.75 
percent interest and with fifty years maturity,54 the ADF was not going to recoup its 
investments from project revenues. Moreover, in 1974, the ADF committed 
US$42,000,000 to projects and studies, which was more than halfofits subscribed capital. 
The ADF thus experienced difficulty meeting its replenishment needs. It needed injec-
tions of additional capital from subscribers or the inclusion of new suscribers. 
The ADF also had difficulty in obtaining firm commitments from its subscribers to 
contribute additional capital. Commitments to the ADF could not be made by the rep-
resentatives of the individual countries. Contributions had to be approved by the legisla-
ture, the head of state, or the finance minister of the member countries. 
One of the factors that aided the ADF in increasing its capital was the admission of 
new members and grants from donor countries. By 1979, the membership to the ADF 
had increased to twenty-two, with new subscribers bringing in UA136.2m.55 Although the 
ADF consistently faced problems in meeting its replenishment goals, its loan operations 
increased appreciably within its first six years of lending activity. Table 7 illustrates the 
rapid expansion of the ADF's operations between 1974 and 1979. 
The ADF, like the ADB, also experienced administrative problems. As indicated in 
Graph II, the ADF has maintained exceptionally high administrative costs to disburse-
ments ratios. The administrative top-heaviness, slow start-up time, and the initial small 
size of its loans56 are the probable causes for these ratios. While it is encouraging to see the 
costs declining rapidly, the continued high level of costs hurts the ADF. The strong 
record of the ADF on the ratio of its administrative costs to commitments, as shown in 
Graph III, can probably be attributed to the relatively high amount of units of account 
committed by the ADF each year. 
The administrative costs of the ADF, although high, are not the ADF's sole problem 
as a lending institution. Graph IV shows the disbursement record of several development 
institutions operating in Africa between 1971 and 1979, and it shows that the ADF has 
maintained the worst record of disbursement of its loans. It should be noted, however, 
that the ADF has shown a steady improvement in its disbursements of loans. 
D. The Creation of the Nigerian Trust Fund 
Graph IV also shows the performance of the NigeriaiI'Trust Fund ["NTF"], which is 
another soft loan window of the ADB. The NTF, the third member of the ADB Group, 
was established in 1976 by the ADB and the Federal Military Government of Nigeria with 
an initial capital stock of fifty million naira from Nigeria.57 The NTF was designed to 
provide financing on concessionary terms, but not at the low levels provided by the ADF 
(NTF loans were to be granted at four percent with maturity periods of up to twenty-five 
years, including a five year grace period).58 Preference was to be given to non-profit 
53 Id. 
5' LENDING POLICY, supra note 52, at 6. The maturity on studies and lines of credit is ten years. 
55 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1979 ANNUAL REpORT ANNEX III 6 (1980). 
56 The ADF loan ceiling has grown to VA8,000,000 for national projects and VA 12,000,000 for 
multinational projects. LENDING POLICY, supra note 51, at 4-5. 
57 In 1976, the naira was equivalent to VS$1.5853. The naira has fluctuated from 1976 to the 
present: in 1980, the naira was equivalent to VS$1.8367 and, in 1983, the naira was equivalent to 
VS$1.4189. 36 INT'L FIN. STATISTICS, August, 1983, at 318, 319. 
58 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1976 ANNUAL REpORT 31 (1977). 
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making infrastructure projects, primarily in low-income countries. The first NTF loan, 
however, was issued to finance the expansion and development of an airport, usually the 
type of project considered by the ADB. Considering the NTF's relatively small capital 
stock when compared to that of the ADF and the ADB, it was expected that the NTF 
would take a minor role as a soft loan partner in the ADB Group.59 The NTF, however, 
chose to make large loans instead of a large number of loans. 
In relation to the number of loans committed, the NTF has funded a higher 
percentage of multinational projects than the ADB and the ADF.60 Between 1976 and 
1979, the NTF committed funds to three multinational projects, contributing a 12.64 
percent share of the total cost of the Abidjan-Accra Highway, 29.92 percent share of the 
Liptako-Gourma Telecommunications project, and 36.46 percent share of the Diama 
Dam project. By taking such an active role in multinational projects, the NTF has 
provided a soft loan base for joint financing with the ADB. 
The large NTF presence in multinational project financing shows Nigeria's role as a 
"prime mover" in regional integration. The notion of "prime movers" in a regional 
community assumes that the necessary investments in interterritorial infrastructure must 
come from the large political and economic powers of the region. As stated earlier, this 
perspective is contested by neo-classical economic theorists who view economic disparities 
between countries as being disintegrative. Nevertheless, Nigeria has disproved this theory 
in West Africa. Through its contributions to the ECOWAS compensation fund and to the 
NTF, Nigeria has used its large economic power to become a positive integrative force in 
West Africa.61 
An examination of the types of projects that the NTF has funded shows that it is 
dedicated to advancing the goals of regional integration in West Africa. For example, the 
Liptako-Gourma Telecommunications project establishes a communications infrastruc-
ture between three relatively underdeveloped West African States: Niger, Mali, and 
Upper Volta. With communications links established between these three countries, the 
potential for increased transactional flows in this subregion can be realized. As discussed 
by the economists Jacob, Teune, and Deutsch,52 a high volume of transactions between 
countries can have a positive influence on the integration process. Prior to the NTF 
investment, the communications links between Niger, Mali, and Upper Volta were limited 
59 .In 1978, the NTF accounted for only 7.5 percent of the ADB Group financing. AFRICAN 
DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1979 ANNUAL REpORT 20 (1980). 
60 See AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1977 ANNUAL REpORT (1978); AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 
BANK, 1978 ANNUAL REpORT (1979); AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1979 ANNUAL REpORT (1980). 
61 Although Nigeria has maintained a firm integrative policy, its government has in at least one 
instance acted to the contrary. In january 1983, the Nigerian Minister of Internal Affairs announced 
that all aliens living or working illegally in Nigeria would be required to leave the country within the 
next two weeks. The expulsion order, which came without notice, marked the beginning of a mass 
exodus of more than two million aliens, the majority of whom were Ghanaian nationals. The 
expulsion order was justified by the Ministers of Internal Affairs on the basis that aliens illegally 
residing in Nigeria were in contravention of the Nigerian Immigration Act of 1963 and the 
ECOW AS Protocol on the free movement of persons. It was further stated that the order was a 
legitimate exercise of Nigeria's sovereign rights and was taken in the interest of national security. See 
Note, The Nigerian Expulsion Order, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 641 (1983), quoting A. Ali Baba, 
Address on Aliens Residing in Nigeria and Registration of ECOWAS, Chad, and Cameroon Citizens 
2 (Feb. 14, 1983) (unpublished manuscript). 
62 For a discussion of the theories of jacob, Teune, and Deutsch, see JACOB & TOSCANO, THE 
INTEGRATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNITIES (1964); Haas, The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on 
the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing, in REGIONAL POLITICS AND WORLD ORDER (Falk & Mendlovitz ed. 
1973). 
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to exchanges from migratory flows. The NTF has provided another channel through 
which transactions within the Liptako-Gourma region may be conducted. 
Another project funded by the NTF which produces a high level of integration in 
West Mrica through interterritorial links is the Abidjan-Accra Highway. A transport 
infrastructure is required to faciliate trade linkages between countries in an economic 
community. This type of infrastructure would include roads, railroads, ports, and air-
ports. At the present time, the existing transport infrastructure in Africa, and particularly 
in West Africa, is fragmented and in poor condition. The NTF investment in the 
Abidjan-Accra Highway improves the interregional trade potential between the Ivory 
Coast and Ghana. The Abidjan-Accra Highway also provides a physical linkage between 
the peoples of the Ivory Coast and Ghana. The NTF loan to the Abidjan-Accra Highway 
is another example of how Nigeria is advancing the integration process through increased 
trade and communications in West Africa. 
The contribution of the NTF in advancing regional development can also be seen in 
the large financial commitment that it makes to each project. The NTF averaged UA2m 
per project in the first year of operations. Between 1976 and 1979, the NTF increased its 
average loan amount per project to UA9.47m [US$12.475m], which was higher than the 
ADB or the ADF averages.63 To the extent that cofinancing takes place between the NTF 
and the ADF, the poorer countries will realize the benefits of large loans on concessionary 
terms. The presence of such a large, soft loan contributor to multinational projects helps 
to make the ADB's participation in these projects more feasible and more attractive. In 
short, the NTFs presence in multinational project financing has provided the ADB 
Group with a soft loan window that has allowed the ADF to take a larger role in funding 
multinational projects and has allowed the ADB to consider a wider range of multina-
tional projects. 
Some of the uncertainties concerning the NTF's operations center around its inability 
to disburse its funds quickly, as shown in Graph IV. This concern appears to be correcta-
ble within the near future. The NTF does not fund a large number of projects, and 
therefore its staff is closer to the individual projects. A small number of projects will allow 
the NT}' to improve its record of disbursements. The NTF is already showing rapid 
improvement. Another concern about the status of the NTF is the funding of its opera-
tions. Unlike the other entities within the ADB Group, the NTF relies on contributions 
from one country. Although Nigeria is relatively wealthy and apparently committed to 
leading the way in regional development, the NTF's source of capital is not as secure as 
that of the ADB or the ADF. The solvency of the NTF is dependent upon the sustained 
commitment of the Nigerian government. The continued solvency of the NTF would 
greatly benefit the ADB Group, which has entered into several jointly financed projects 
through this soft loan window, particularly in the area of multinational projects. A soft 
loan window which improves the ADB's activity is essential for the ADB to carry out the 
mandate that it had difficulty meeting during its early years: financing regional develop-
ment. 
IV. THE ADB's PERFORMANCE IN PROMOTING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN WEST AFRICA 
A. Early Studies on West African Multinational Projects 
The constraints on the ADB in financing multinational projects in its first seven years 
of investment activity have been outlined previously. One of the major constraints was the 
63 See AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1976 ANNUAL REpORT (1977); AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 
BANK, 1977 ANNUAL REpORT (1978); AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1978 ANNUAL REpORT (1979); 
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1979 ANNUAL REpORT (1980). 
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absence of regional authorities and other development agencies to Jom m financing 
multinational projects. The establishment of several regional support bodies in West 
Africa helped to overcome this constraint. 
During the early years of the ADB's activity in multinational development, its efforts 
were concentrated on conducting, financing, and providing technical support for studies. 
Many of the early studies concerned West Africa. The first of these studies involved a 
joint venture between the ADB and the Mutual Aid and Loan Guarantee Fund of the 
Entente Council. The study concerned the possibility of increasing economic cooperation· 
between the Entente countries and Ghana. The ADB and the Entente Council held 
several meetings to discuss the issues and finally contracted the services of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund to carry out the actual study. In comparison to the present level of 
financing of multinational projects in West Africa, the 1969 ADB-Entente Council study 
appears to have been insignificant, but at that time no other aid agencies, with the possible 
exceptions of the Economic Commission for Africa and the Food and Agricultural 
Organization, were active in multinational projects or studies. 
Before the end of 1969, the ADB had initiated two other studies in West Africa. One 
of the studies examined the potential for tourism in West Africa with the aim of identify-
ing projects and programs in this area.64 The other study was a survey of shrimp 
resources in West Africa. This particular study was described as being "investment 
oriented" in that one objective was "to identify suitable sites for the setting up of shrimp 
processing plants in various West African countries."65 
B. Establishment of the SIFIDA and the African-Re 
More important than the ADB studies in West Africa were its early attempts to 
develop a network of support institutions in Africa that would work to promote economic 
development on the national and regional levels. As early as 1968, the ADB was actively 
examining the potential for developing an African Insurance and Re-Insurance Corpora-
tion. The agency, as originally conceived by the ADB, would develop and strengthen 
African insurance markets by supplementing and reinforcing national initiatives with 
"multinational action on a regional level particularly in the field of reinsurance."66 The 
ADB hoped to tap potential savings for development finance by promoting the insurance 
industry in Africa.67 The agency would initiate "mutual cooperation among African 
insurers and reinsurers" and would establish a "regional Re-Insurance Corporation for 
Africa."6B The African Re-Insurance Corporation ["African-Re"] was established in 1976 
with an authorized capital of US$IS,OOO,OOO, two-thirds of which was available for 
subscription. The ADB holds ten percent of the capital and has a representative on the 
nine-member Board of Directors.69 
Another one of the ADB's early attempts to increase development money for Africa 
and to advance regional development was the Societe Internationale Financiere pour les 
Investissements et Ie Developpement en Afrique ["SIFIDA"]. The SIFIDA was proposed 
in 1969 and began operating in 1970. The SIFIDA, like the African-Re, was designed to 
secure additional resources and to provide the institutional support that the ADB needed 
to consider broader operations. 
64 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1969 ANNUAL REpORT 35 (1970). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 36. 
67 Id. 
68 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1970 ANNUAL REpORT 25 (1971). 
69 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1976 ANNUAL REpORT 32 (1977). 
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C. Other Contributions to Regional Development 
The ADB has been one of the lead institutions in establishing regional agencies and 
regionally based unions in West Africa. The ADB has participated in the creation of the 
Association of African Development Institutions, the CEAO, African-Re, the SIFIDA, the 
Mano River Union, and the ECOWAS. The ADB's most ambitious venture in forming 
regional bodies has been its role in the creation of the Mano River Union and the 
economic unions of the CEAO and the ECOW AS. 
The SIFIDA was designed as an institution "to ensure an adequate inflow of private 
capital and expertise from the capital-exporting countries to Africa."70 The idea was to 
establish a "Multinational Finance Company for Development in Africa,"71 comprised of 
contributors from capital-exporting countries. The original members of the SIFIDA were 
the ADB, France, Italy, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom. 72 In addition to 
opening a channel of communication between the ADB and potential outside donors, the 
SIFlDA attracted new capital for African development. Furthermore, the SIFIDA pro-
vided technical expertise and was a source of investment that supplemented the lending 
operations of the ADB. 
The creation of these regional bodies by the ADB contributed to regional integration 
and development in Africa. Following the neo-functionalist perspective on regional 
integration, the formation of regional institutions that bring together professionals and 
technicians from the member countries is essential to establishing interregional linkages. 
The economist Ernst Haas has suggested that these sectorally based regional institutions 
which bring together professionals and technicians in a specific joint venture will create 
positive integrative "spillover."73 The positive outcome of these regional cooperative 
ventures would create a process that would lead to increased accretions of power to a 
regional authority. 
The ADB has initiated this process by creating these regional institutions. All of these 
institutions provide interregional linkages between professionals and technicians and 
produce the kind of "spillover" effects that Haas described as producing positive 
influences on the integration process and regional development.74 
The Mano River Union, in addition to creating a customs union between Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Guinea, administers a completed ADB project, the Mano River Bridge. 
The Mano River Union has aided the integration process since it includes professionals 
and technicians from the three member countries, and also because the operation of the 
Mano River Bridge provides another channel for interstate transactional flows and 
commerce. 
The benefits to West African regional development from the CEAO and the 
ECOW AS have been even greater. The CEAO and the ECOWAS are the only regional 
entities in West Africa that are committed to economic integration. They function as the 
region's only economic unions.75 Although neither the CEAO nor the ECOWAS receive 
70 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1969 ANNUAL REpORT 38 (1970). 
71 [d. 
72 [d. 
73 See HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, SoCIAL AND ECONOMIC FORCES 1950-1957 
(1958) for a discussion of the theory of "spillover." In short, Haas' theory of "spillover" provides that 
a gradual move toward federalism, which is produced by interregional links, can be the foundation 
for a successful integration process. 
74 [d. 
7S The Entente Council is generally concerned with fostering economic cooperation between 
the countries, rather than forming an economic union among them. 
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any ADB project financing, they aid the ADB in its efforts toward regional development 
by providing the institutional support of economic unions. 
The ECOWAS has established separate commissions to coordinate economic rela-
tions between member countries. For example, the Industry, Agriculture, and Natural 
Resour-ces Commission collects feasibility studies and similar reports on proposed indus-
trial projects in the region. This commission also acts as a forum for debating issues 
between countries with conflicting interests in multinational projects. This commission's 
involvement with industrial development assists the ADB group in selecting multinational 
projects. 
The ADB began to increase its involvement with multinational projects in 1976. With 
subscriptions supplemented by outside borrowings, the ADB had ';ncreased its paid-in 
capital amount to US$256.9m by 1976.76 The ADF and the NTF were also in operation at 
this time and Arab investors had begun to finance projects in Africa through the BADEA 
and the Kuwait Fund. 77 The increased presence of the IBRD and the IDA in multina-
tional project financing provided the ADB with needed cofinancing. As a result, the ADB 
Group emerged as the largest financier of multinational projects in West Africa between 
1976 and 1980: the ADB Group US$134.89m; the IBRD and the IDA US$128.5m.78 
Clearly, there is no other institution that is better equipped, financially and adminis-
tratively, to assume a larger role in financing multinational projects in West Africa than 
the IBRD/IDA. Despite the greater capacity of the IBRD/IDA to take on this task, the 
ADB Group remains the leader in the area of multinational project financing in West 
Africa. 
Graph V provides a summary of the annual funding to multinational projects in West 
Africa by the major development institutions. By 1978, there was a greater level of 
cofinancing between the various branches of the ADB Group than there was in any other 
development institution, including the IBRD/IDA. The ADB Group member with the 
most activity in this area was the NTF, which provided sufficient soft loancofinancing in 
multinational projects to have permitted the ADB Group to take on more projects. 
The ADB Group has chosen to finance a diverse range of multinational projects in 
West Africa. The following is a list of the ADB Group projects, with the Group member 
and tfKTtotal funding given: 
1. Regie de Chemin de fer Abidjan/Niger ["RAN"] (Ivory Coast, Upper 
Vo1ta)79 
1972 - finance procurement of rolling stock - ADB (US$3.619m); 
1976 -line of credit to finance 1975-80 RAN investment program - ADB 
(US$5.5m) 
2. Mano River Union (Sierra Leone, Liberia) 
1973 - Mano River Bridge - ADB (US$1.568m) 
3. Organization pour 1a Mise en Valeur de F1euve Senegal ["OMVS"] 
(Senegal, Mauritania, Mali)80 
76 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1976 ANNUAL REpORT, Subscriptions (1977). 
77 See generally ARAB BANK FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA, 1975 ANNUAL REpORT 
(1975); KUWAIT FUND FOR ARAB ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1975-1976 ANNUAL REpORT (1976). 
78 See the ANNUAL REpORTS, PROJECT FUNDING, for the ADB and the WORLD BANK for the 
period between 1976 and 1980. 
79 The RAN is an interstate agency between the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta. The RAN plans 
the development and coordinates the operation of the railroad line connecting the Ivory Coast and 
Upper Volta. 
80 The OMVS is a regional agency which undertook the Diama Dam project to aid the countries 
of Senegal, Mauritania, and Mali in developing their hydroelectric power capacity. This increased 
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1979 - Diama Dam Project - ADB (US$15.807m) NTF 
(US$15.807m) 
4. Societe des Cimens d' Afrique de rOuest ["CIMAO"] (Ghana, Togo, 
Ivory Coast)81 
1976 - cement plan - ADB (US$8.2m) 
5. Liptako-Gourma Regional Integrated Development Authority (Niger, 
Mali, Upper Volta) 
1978 - telecommunications project - ADB (US$13.0279m) -
NTF(US$8.598m) 
These infrastructure projects are the types of projects needed to begin to confront the 
problem of industrial imbalances between the member countries. 
The ECOWAS community lacks the interstate infrastructure needed to conduct and 
expand interstate trade and communication. The special funds of the ECOWAS have 
been inadequate in effectively dealing with this problem. The projects financed by the 
ADB Group are positive indications of the ADB Group's commitment to filling the 
investment gap in infrastructure projects within the ECOWAS community. 
Although these infrastructure projects have been successful in promoting regional 
development, they have not been sufficient to remedy the infrastructure problem. The 
ADB Group will have to consider additional resources in order to meet this investment 
need. 
First, the ADB Group should increase the scale of cofinancing with outside lenders. 
Two potential sources for soft loan credits for infrastructure projects are the BADEA and 
the Kuwait Fund. Graph VI shows that these organizations provide loans at terms 
comparable to, or lower than, the NTF. With respect to industrial development, the ADB 
Group should try to increase its cofinancing activity with the IBRD. The costs for the 
development of new industry usually far exceeds the loan ceiling of the ADB Group. The 
presence of a large investment institution such as the IBRD would allow the ADB Group 
to finance projects which it could not finance alone. 
Second, the ADB should open its capital stock to non-African countries. The increase 
in the capital base would allow the ADB to expand its investment operations, raise its loan 
ceiling, and relax the pressures on the African member countries to meet their paid-in 
obligations. The presence of foreign subscribers would increase the ADB's borrowing 
capacity in the international market, and would also allow the ADB to alter its callable to 
paid-in capital ratio appreciably. As noted earlier, positive results were realized by the 
ADB when it attempted to float bonds in the Eurobond market after the ADB changed its 
callable to paid-in capital ratio in 1976. 
Third, the ADB should increase its access to the international bond market. The 
World Bank operates primarily from its financial activities in the European market. The 
access of the World Bank is assured because of the large number of member countries, 
the members' credit standing, and the members' financial commitment. The ADB should 
upgrade its creditworthiness to increase its access to the Eurobond market. Until the ADB 
opens its capital stock to non-Africans, however, it will have difficulty strengthening its 
credit standing. 
Fourth, the ADB should increase the membership to the ADF. The ADF has been 
capacity helps provide the infrastructure essential to industrial development in a region that includes 
two underdeveloped countries, Mauritania and Mali. 
81 The CIMAO is a cooperative venture between Ghana, the Ivory Coast, and Togo. The 
CIMAO cement plant is located in Togo, the least developed of the three countries. The cement 
plant has been supplemented by major infrastructure development in Togo, such as the construction 
of ports and roads. The Ivory Coast and Ghana will provide the limestone and the electricity to make 
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able to tap the financial resources of many of the industrialized nations. The ADF could 
attempt to increase its resource base by attracting new subscribers. Additional capital in 
the ADF could be earmarked for infrastructure development which would help close the 
investment gap in infrastructure development within the ECOWAS community. 
CONCLUSION 
The success of the ECOWAS treaty and program is dependent upon large invest-
ments in multinational infrastructure development and new industry in poorer countries. 
Without these investments, the ECOW AS community will never realize the ultimate goal 
of economic union in West Africa. The ADB Group has taken the lead in promoting the 
ECOWAS program through its multinational investments, but a larger investment institu-
tion is needed to finance and cofinance development projects. 
In light of the fact that other funding sources such as the IBRD may not be major 
financiers in multinational development projects in West Africa, the ADB should expand 
its resource base in order to increase its role in such projects. Under the present condi-
tions, the growth, development, and strength of the ECOWAS community will be directly 
tied to the performance of the ADB Group and its investments in West Africa. 
the plant operational. By locating the cement plant in Togo, the CIMAO community is actively 
countering the tendency of industry to locate in the growth poles of Abidjan and Accra. 
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APPENDIX I 
TABLE 1 
[Vol. 4:151 
RATIO OF LoAN COMMITMENTS TO ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS BY INSTITUTION 
(US$m) (US$m) Administrative Cost 
Year Commitments Administrative Cost Commitments 
ABD 1971 24.69 3.485 14.1% 
1972 27.38 3.502 12.79% 
1973 43.13 4.366 10.1% 
IBRD 1971 2505 66.32 2.6% 
1972 2966 78.567 2.6% 
1973 3408 91.02 2.6% 
CDC 1973 523.25 6.86 1.3% 
SOURCE: Annual Reorts of the ADB, the IBRD/IDA, and the CDC. Figures converted to U.S. 
dollars by exchange rates listed in ABD Annual Reports 1971, 1972, and 1973. 
TABLE 2 
RATIO OF DISBURSEMENTS TO LOANS By INSTITUTION (1968-1973) 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
ADB 
Loans (US$m) 2.98 7.92 11.15 24.69 27.38 43.13 
Disbursements (US$m) .4 .76 2.3 6.3 13.46 20.27 
Ratio .1243 .0959 .206 .255 .491 .469 
IBRD 
Loans (US$m) 847 1399 1680 1921 1966 2051 
Disbursements (US$m) 772 762 772 915 1182 1180 
Ratio .911 .545 .459 .476 .601 .575 
CDC 
Loans (US$m) 423.25 
Disbursements (US$m) 341.37 
Ratio .652 
SOURCE: Annual Reports of the ADB and the IBRD/IDA for years listed. Report and Accounts of 
the CDC for years listed. Currency exchange based on exchange rates from the ADB 
Annual Reports for years listed. 
TABLE 3 
ADB PAID-IN/CALLABLE CAPITAL AND ARREARs/PAID-IN CAPITAL RECORD 
(A) (B) (B/A) (D) (D/A) 
Year Paid-In (UAm) Callable (UAm) Ratio Arrears % of Paid-In 
1971 110.2 110.2 1: 1 28.845 26.17 
1972 127.2 127.2 1:1 29.493 23.18 
1973 20.496 
1974 185.58 185.58 1: 1 18.729 10.09 
1975 193.93 193.93 1: 1 22.9 11.8 
SOURCE: ADB Annual Reports 1971-1975. 
TABLE 4 
ADB BORROWINGS, CALLABLE RATIO/PAID-IN, RECORD OF ARREARS 
(A) (B) (B/A) (D) (D/A) 
Year Paid-In (UAm) Callable (UAm) Ratio Arrears % of Paid-In Borrowings (UAm) 
1974 185.58 185.58 1:1 18.729 10.09 10.648 
1975 193.93 193.93 1:1 22.9 11.8 75.33b 
1976 256.9 362.23 1.4: 1 23.933 9.3 34.98c 
1977 279.825 430.02 1.53: 1 26.444 9.45 150.13d 
1978 300.23 490.23 1.63: 1 38.092 12.68 164.84 
1979 300.23 900.69 3: 1 29.619 9.86 281.71" 
8 _ borrowings from member central banks. 
b _ principally from syndicate banks (US$ 65m). 
C _ primarily Eurocredits and bilateral contributions. 
d _ first issuance of bonds in foreign market (Kuwait - KD 5m). 
- first issuance of bonds to central banks other than from member countries (US $39.5m). 
" - first entrance in Eurobond market (Germany - DM 300m). 
TABLE 5 
AVERAGE SIZE OF LoANS BY THE ADB 
Year Number Amount (UAm) Average (UAm) Average (US$m) 
1974 25 73.4 2.936 3.54 
1975 28 85.9 3.06 3.39 
1976 25 80.45 3.218 3.575 
1977 30 126.78 4.226 4.695 
1978 33 157.9 4.78 6.232 
1979 35 207.9 5.94 7.824 
SOURCE: ADB Annual Reports 1974-1979. 
TABLE 6 
RATIO OF LOANS TO DISBURSEMENTS 
ADB (US$m) 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Loans 24.69 27.38 43.13 88.52 103.64 97.05 154.0 205.72 273.95 
Disbursements 6.3 13.46 20.27 23.89 48.01 51.39 73.06 92.8 107.65 
Ratio .255 .4915 .469 .269 .463 .5295 .474 .474 .3929 
IBRD (US$m) 
Loans 1921 1966 2051 3218 4320 4977 5759 6098 6889 
Disbursements 9155 1182 1180 1533 1995 2470 2636 2787 3602 
Ratio .476 .601 .575 .461 .496 .457 .515 
SOURCE: African Development Bank, 1979 Annual Report 11 (1980); IBRD/IDA Annual Reports 
1971-1979. 
Year 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
Number 
17 
23 
18 
17 
24 
23 
TABLE 7 
ADF - AVERAGE SIZE OF LoANS 
Amount (US$m) 
42.0 
83.68 
71.95 
127.51 
155.1 
188.2 
Average (UAm) 
2.47 
3.638 
3.9777 
7.5 
6.46 
8.18 
SOURCE: ADF Annual Reports 1974-1976, ADB Annual Reports 1977-1979. 
Average (US$m) 
2.74 
4.04 
4.44 
8.33 
8.419 
10.778 
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GRAPH II 
Ratio of Administrative Costs to Disbursements by Institution 
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GRAPH III 
Ratio of Administrative Costs to Commitments by Institution 
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GRAPH IV 
(percentile) Ratio of Disbursements to Loans by Institution 
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Graph V 
Volume of Loans/Credits to Multinational Projects/Programs in West Africa by Institution 
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GRAPH VI 
Average Size of Loans/Credits for Projects in Africa by Institution 
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